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Abstract: We present experimental data on message transmission in a
free-space optical (FSO) link at an eye-safe wavelength, using a testbed
consisting of one sender and two receiver terminals, where the latter two are
a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper. The testbed allows us to emulate a
typical scenario of physical-layer (PHY) security such as satellite-to-ground
laser communications. We estimate information-theoretic metrics including
secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability, and expected code lengths for
given secrecy criteria based on observed channel statistics. We then discuss
operation principles of secure message transmission under realistic fading
conditions, and provide a guideline on a multi-layer security architecture by
combining PHY security and upper-layer (algorithmic) security.
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1. Introduction
Free-space optical (FSO) communication is a promising technology for enhancing the connec-
tivity of wireless networks [1], thanks to the features such as wide band width in an unregulated
spectrum, ultra-low inter-channel interference, and power-efficient transmission. Potential ap-
plications of FSO communication include satellite laser communications [2], a network system
comprised of unmanned aerial vehicles, high-altitude platforms or drones [3–5], the last one
mile link from the fiber backbone to the clients premises [6] and military applications [7, 8].
As FSO communication becomes more and more important in these applications, the secu-
rity requirements also become more demanding. Although high directionality of laser beam
makes FSO communication inherently more secure than RF counterparts, FSO communication
can still suffer from optical tapping risks, especially when the main lobe of laser beam foot-
print is considerably wider than the receiver size [9–11]. These risks would be pronounced in
urban communications where an eavesdropper would hide in the top of the same building as
the legitimate receiver [12], or in satellite-to-ground laser communications in which the beam
footprint would be a scale of km. Therefore, secure communication over FSO links still remains
a challenging task.
Traditionally, security has been highly dependent on the upper layer protocols such as con-
ventional encryption techniques with a pre-shared secret key or a key exchanged via public key
cryptosystems. The security of these protocols is proved with algorithmic means. Then, it will
be weakened as computer technologies and decryption algorithms are advancing. Moreover,
with the rapid growth of the number of communication nodes, the key distribution and man-
agement are becoming increasingly difficult, and are introducing larger overhead and latency to
the system. During the past few years, however, physical layer (PHY) security [13,14] has been
gaining research attentions as a means to complement conventional encryption techniques. Its
security is provided in information theoretical manners based on the particular coding tech-
niques [15–19] or the careful signal designs [20–23]. Different from conventional encryption
techniques, no computational assumptions are placed on the eavesdropper. Practically, the ex-
isting security system can be enhanced by introducing PHY security as a first line of defense
against eavesdropping.
The fundamental theoretical frameworks of PHY security was laid by Wyner [16], and
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [17] based on secure message transmission over a wiretap channel, and
by Ahlswede and Csisza´r [18], and Maurer [19] based on secret key agreement from common
randomness. In the wiretap channel model, its security is provided by an appropriate channel
code guaranteeing both the reliability for the legitimate receiver and the secrecy against the
eavesdropper. If the channel from the sender to the eavesdropper is a degraded version of that
from the sender to the legitimate receiver, a non-zero secrecy rate can be achieved by sacrific-
ing a fraction of the message rate. While such a degraded condition seems not to be realistic
in wired communications, it is more reasonable in FSO communications built up between par-
ties with a direct line-of-sight (LoS). Specifically, in LoS links, surveillance cameras will be
able to detect any suspicious activity which makes it harder for an eavesdropper to intercept
the main lobe of laser beam. On the perspective of this scenario, there have been theoretical
studies [12, 24–26] on the potential of PHY security in FSO communications.
In spite of these remarkable theoretical studies, realization of PHY security is still a challeng-
ing issue. In FSO links, the intensity of the transmitted beam and the statistics of the received
signals vary in a time scale of ms due to atmospheric turbulences. This kind of fading effect
makes it difficult to implement an efficient coding scheme which can ensure PHY security un-
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the wireless wiretap channel model and wiretap channel cod-
ing [27].
der various conditions. Some approaches to mitigate the effect of atmospheric turbulences have
been investigated such as the adaptive real time selection technique [28] in a horizontal quan-
tum communication link of 143 km between La Palma and Tenerife Islands [29]. However,
experimental data and analyses on FSO fading links from the viewpoint of PHY security are
still overwhelmingly lacking.
This motivates us to collect transmission data in an FSO wiretap channel and analyze them in
terms of fundamental metrics of PHY security. To this end, we have constructed a metropolitan
terrestrial FSO link testbed (Tokyo FSO Testbed). This testbed consists of one sender terminal
and two receiver terminals, one for the legitimate receiver and the other for the eavesdropper.
Each of the two is 7.8 km distance apart from the sender terminal. The purposes of the testbed
are (1) to examine PHY security techniques (e.g., secure message transmission and secret key
agreement) in real-field FSO links, (2) to emulate typical FSO communication scenarios such
as satellite-to-ground laser communications, and (3) to accumulate transmission data under
several real-field conditions and utilize them for practical system design. In this paper, we focus
on secure message transmission and analyze the characteristics of the FSO wiretap channel by
transmitting a pseudorandom binary sequence based on on-off keying modulation. Using the
output signal statistics, we estimate secrecy rates and related security metrics. We then discuss
how the legitimate party can set a guideline for operating secure message transmission based
on the observed data with pilot signals and the data accumulated from the past.
2. Wiretap channel and performance metric
Throughout the paper, we consider secure message transmission via a wireless wiretap channel
system illustrated in Fig. 1. The sender (Alice) encodes a confidential message into a code word
random variable (RV) Xn for transmission over the wiretap channel, where n is the code length.
We assume that Alice uses on-off keying modulation, thus RV X takes a value with 0 or the
peak power of the transmission laser. Moreover, we also assume that the laser power and the
input probability distribution PX over X are fixed irrespective of the channel state.
The legitimate receiver (Bob) observes the output via a discrete-time quasi-static fading
channel (the main channel) given by
Y = HBX +NB, (1)
being HB the channel gain RV and NB the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) RV. The
eavesdropper (Eve) is also capable to observe Alice’s transmission from the output via a
discrete-time quasi-static fading channel (the wiretapper channel) given by
Z = HEX +NE , (2)
being HE the channel gain RV and NE the AWGN RV. Here, upper case letters X ,Y,Z,HB,HE
are all positive real RVs since we modulate intensity of light. For later convenience, we shall
use lower case letters x,y,z,hB,hE to denote realizations of X ,Y,Z,HB,HE , respectively.
In order to transmit m bits of confidential information reliably and securely through the wire-
tap channel, Alice introduces some redundancy to perform error correction and some random
dummy information as the cost of additional secrecy. This entails adding redundant bits and l
random dummy bits to the code word and hence increasing its length to n as shown in the lower
panel of Fig. 1. This scheme is particularly referred to as wiretap channel coding. To design a
wiretap channel code of length n, we shall specify two rates, the message rate RB = m/n and
the randomness rate RE = l/n in bits/letter.
We assume that the channel gains HB and HE remain constants hB and hE , respectively, during
specific interval (coherence interval). In each coherence interval with channel realizations hB
and hE , one has to satisfy RB+RE ≤ I(PX ,PY |X ,HB) to establish a reliable communication, where
I(PX ,W ) is the mutual information with the input probability distribution PX and the transition
probability distribution W , and PY |X ,HB denotes the transition probability distribution of the
main channel. On the other hand, RE ≥ I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) should be satisfied for confidentiality,
where PZ|X ,HE denotes the transition probability distribution of the wiretapper channel. Hence,
the message rate RB must satisfy the following relation in each coherence interval,
RB ≤ RS,i(hB,hE)≡max[0, I(PX ,PY |X ,HB)− I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE )]. (3)
We shall call RS,i(hB,hE) the instantaneous secrecy rate given hB and hE . When there is no
ambiguity, we will drop the dependence on (hB,hE).
In this paper, Bob is assumed to use hard-decision decoding where the value of individual bits
are quantized to either y = 0 or y = 1 based on the threshold yth. Thus, the mutual information
I(PX ,PY |X ,HB) is calculated as
I(PX ,PY |X ,HB) = ∑
x∈{0,1}
∑
y∈{0,1}
PX (x)PY |X ,HB(y|x,hB) log2
[
PY |X ,HB(y|x,hB)
∑x′ PX (x′)PY |X ,HB(y|x′,hB)
]
. (4)
In the above equation, the transition probability functions for y= 1 and y= 0 given by x∈{0,1}
are defined as
PY |X ,HB(1|x,hB) =
N(y≥ yth|x,hB)
N(x)
, PY |X ,HB(0|x,hB) =
N(y≤ yth|x,hB)
N(x)
, (5)
where N(x) is the number of an input x ∈ {0,1} transmitted by Alice, and N(y≥ yth|x,hB) and
N(y ≤ yth|x,hB) are the numbers of events of y ≥ yth and y ≤ yth conditioned by an input x ∈
{0,1} in the coherence interval with the channel realization hB, respectively. The threshold yth
should be numerically optimized such that the mutual information I(PX ,PY |X ,HB) is maximized.
On the other hand, Eve is assumed to use soft-decision decoding which uses a whole range
of output values to make decisions. This is the reasonable in secure communication, since the
mutual information based on soft-decision decoding is slightly larger than that based on hard-
decision decoding [30]. In this decoding, considering the finite size of samples (see Appendix
A), we quantize the experimental data into K bins with an identical width ∆. Thus, the transition
probability function PZ|X ,HE (z
(i)|x,hE) is calculated as follows:
PZ|X ,HE (z
(i)|x,hE) = N(z
(i)|x,hE)
N(x)
, (6)
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being N(z(i)|x,hE) the number of events that z is in i-th bin conditioned by an input x∈ {0,1} in
the coherence interval with the channel realization hE . The mutual information I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE )
is calculated as
I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) = ∑
x∈{0,1}
K
∑
i=1
PX (x)PZ|X ,HE (z
(i)|x,hE) log2
[
PZ|X ,HE (z
(i)|x,hE)
∑x′ PX (x′)PZ|X ,HE (z(i)|x′,hE)
]
. (7)
3. Overview of the experimental setup
The ideal technological goal is to evaluate the instantaneous secrecy rate RS,i by monitoring
the channel state information (CSI), namely, the channel gains of both the main and wiretapper
channels, in various conditions depending on weather, temperature, and instruments. However,
due to the effect of atmospheric turbulences, the gains HB and HE are always fluctuating and
hardly predicted. This kind of fading effect makes it difficult to implement an efficient wiretap
channel coding scheme under various conditions. This motivates us to collect transmission
data in an FSO wiretap channel by using Tokyo FSO Testbed introduced in this section. The
testbed and its experimental data allow us not only to analyze the secrecy performance of secure
message transmission based on the information-theoretic metrics, but also to determine whether
secure message transmission can be established or not under a given condition.
A schematic layout of Tokyo FSO Testbed is shown in Fig. 2(a). We set Alice in
an all-weather telescope dome on the rooftop of a building in the University of Electro-
Communications (UEC) at Chofu of Japan (35◦39′28.8′′N, 139◦32′39.5′′E). In the National
Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) at Koganei (35◦42′24.2′′N,
139◦29′19.3′′E), we set Bob’s receiver in the sixth floor of a building. All optical components
are located on a high-precision motorized gimbal. On the rooftop of the building which is just
above the sixth floor, we set a container type terminal which takes the role of Eve. This terminal
consists of an all-weather scanner on the top of the container. Receiver optics and electronics
are located on an optical breadboard inside of the container. These facilities form an FSO link
with a straight-line distance of 7.8 km.
In Fig. 2(b), we show an overview of the optical and electrical components in our testbed.
The light source is a narrow linewidth direct-modulated laser diode (DM LD, Sense Light
Semiconductors DL-BF10-CLS101B-S1550: band width less than 50 kHz at CW operation
mode) with a central wavelength λc of 1550 nm. This wavelength is selected since it suffers
from less free-space attenuation [31] and meets the eye-safety regulations [32]. A signal is in
the format of a 10 MHz pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS) with length of 215− 1, and
the modulation scheme is Non-Return-to-Zero on-off keying. The signal light is coupled into
a fiber collimator (aperture diameter of 10 mm and divergence angle of 1.0 mrad) via a single
mode fiber (SMF) and expanded into an approximately 5.5 mm beam. The laser is driven by
direct modulation mode, and the average output power is set to be 100 mW. The collimator is
mounted on a motorized gimbal driven by a high-resolution stepper motor.
At Bob’s terminal, a fraction of the signal beam spot whose diameter is approximately 8 m is
coupled into a Cassegrain telescope (aperture diameter of 111 mm and focal length of 800 mm)
which collimates the beam down into 10 mm in diameter. Then, the beam is focused into a 200
µm multimode fiber (MMF) and finally sent to a photodiode detector (PD, Terahelz Technology
Inc. TIA-525 optical receiver) whose noise equivalent power (NEP) is 3.0 pW/
√
Hz. The total
optical loss of Bob’s system, including the attenuation due to the window glass, is estimated to
be -14dB. At Eve’s terminal, the signal beam is tapped with a Cassegrain telescope (aperture
diameter of 100 mm and focal length of 2000 mm). The intensity of the beam is measured
by an avalanche photodiode detector (APD, Laser Components A-CUBE-I200-10) with higher
sensitivity (NEP is 160 fW/
√
Hz) than Bob’s detector. The total optical loss of Eve’s system was
measured to be -9dB. The comparison of the NEPs of the detectors and the total optical losses
between the terminals corroborates that Eve’s receiver system is much more sensitive than
Bob’s one. This fact allows us to emulate a reasonable situation where Eve’s receiver is much
better than Bob’s one. In addition, we can emulate more various wiretap channel conditions by
directing Alice’s beam to several positions between Bob and Eve.
At both terminals, the photodetector signal is amplified by a preamplifier (Hamamatsu
C6438) and then sent to a USB oscilloscope (sampling rate of 50 MHz and bandwidth limit
of 20 MHz by a low-pass filter (LPF)) for A/D conversion. Digitized data are then sent to a
computer. In order to identify the transmitted signal from the received data, Bob and Eve inde-
pendently perform an off-line PC-based data recovery process of which the flow chart is shown
in the middle panel of Fig. 2(b). First, high frequency noise is filtered out by a LPF (cutoff
frequency fc of 6 MHz) from the input sequence. Then, an accompanying clock signal is gen-
erated via a clock data recovery (CDR) process, and the data are down sampled (DS) into 10
MHz of repetition rate by referencing the clock data. Finally, to perform the frame synchro-
nization, cross-correlation between the down sampled data and the original PRBS sequence is
calculated. In the experiment, the above-mentioned flow is implemented via LabVIEW.
4. Results and analysis
4.1. Configuration of the experiment
Figure 3 shows our experimental configuration of FSO transmission campaign held on 17
November 2015 under cloudy Tokyo skies. During the experiment, the beam centroid is put
in a position closer to Bob’s terminal than Eve’s one as shown by red circle, such that the
received power at Eve would be slightly degraded compared to that at Bob. This geometrical
configuration allows us to emulate typical wiretap channel model for satellite-to-ground laser
communications where Eve attempts to tap the lobe of the beam footprint. Although our hori-
zontal link cannot precisely emulate the realistic fading-induced scintillation in the vertical link
of satellite-to-ground laser communications (the former is in one atmospheric layer while the
latter is affected by several atmospheric layers with different scintillation effects), we can derive
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Fig. 3. Experimental configuration of FSO transmission campaign held on 17 November
2015, and typical waveforms received by Eve (upper) and Bob (lower) over 5 µs. The data
are taken at 14:43:00 JST. In the figure, we subtracted the DC offset of a detector from the
received signal.
the basic principles of the channel estimation and the design of secure message transmission
systems for a generic FSO link.
We conducted the experiments in 5 time periods, namely, 14:43 - 14:46, 15:57 - 16:00, 16:33
- 16:36, 17:37 - 17:40, and 18:10 - 18:13 in JST. We note that 16:33 JST was the sunset time on
the day. In each time period, we made 10 times of transmission and 2× 106 bits of the PRBS
are transmitted in each transmission with 200 ms duration. To characterize the instantaneous
secrecy rate RS,i, we divide the duration of each 200 ms transmission into 50 of the 4 ms slot
which includes 2× 105 samples corresponding to 4× 104 bits. In this time slot, the channel
realizations hB and hE seem to be roughly constant hence the coherence time of the fading
channels is in the order of ms. Moreover, samples of statistically sufficient size are included
in the duration. The effect of atmospheric turbulence is nicely captured as the variation of the
instantaneous secrecy rate at each time slot.
In this transmission campaign, we observed a pointing deviation of the received peak power,
which can be compensated by rearranging the angles of the receiver telescopes every hour. We
observed a typical deviation rate of 0.2 mrad/hour, which may be attributed to the refraction
effect due to the varying and nonuniform air temperature and to the thermal expansion of the
building in which the two receivers are located. In the time scale of each transmission (a few
minutes), the FSO link stays in the same condition.
4.2. Temporal variation of instantaneous secrecy rate
In Fig. 4, we show the temporal variation of the instantaneous secrecy rate RS,i (solid line) and
the average output voltage (dotted line) for the typical 200 ms FSO transmission at 17:37:00
JST, in the late evening time about an hour after the sunset. This time period is a typical
case where the fading-induced scintillation is not so heavy. Actually, the highest rate (8.30
Mbits/second (Mbps), from 12 ms to 16 ms) and the lowest rate (5.25 Mbps, from 76 ms to 80
ms) are not so far different (Taking into account the 10 MHz repetition rate of the input, Bob
would gain 10 Mbps of information if Eve was absent.). Moreover, the fluctuation of the average
output voltage at Bob (dotted line) seems not to have a direct correlation with the instantaneous
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Fig. 4. Temporal variation of instantaneous secrecy rate RS,i (solid line) and the average
output voltage (dotted line) for the experimental data at 17:37:00 JST, the late evening time
about an hour after the sunset, on 17 November 2015. In each time slot, the measurement
duration is 4 ms and 4×104 bits are contained. Two upper left insets are the histograms of
the output voltage for the best case (between 12 ms and 16 ms) and the worst case (between
76 ms and 80 ms). The upper rightmost inset is the output voltage histogram for the whole
period of the 200 ms transmission. Width of histogram bins are 0.3 mV both for Bob’s and
Eve’s data (see Appendix A). In the histogram, we subtracted the DC offset of the detector
from the received signal.
secrecy rate RS,i (solid line).
In the two left upper insets of Fig. 4, we show the histograms of the output voltage of the
detectors for the best and worst cases. Clearly, the two peaks in Eve’s received power histograms
overlap with each other while the peaks in Bob’s one are perfectly separated in both insets. It
turns out that under the condition of this time period, we can potentially transmit at most 5.25
Mbps of information with perfect secrecy. We also show the histograms of the output voltage
for the whole period of 200 ms transmission in the upper rightmost inset of Fig. 4. The spectra
of these histograms are not so broader even compared to those of 4 ms time slot. In general, the
stronger the light fluctuation is, the broader the spectrum of the intensity distribution becomes
[33], but Fig. 4 is not the case.
Figure 5 shows the temporal variation of the instantaneous secrecy rate RS,i (solid line) and
the average output voltage (dotted line) for the typical 200 ms FSO transmission at 16:34:20
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Fig. 5. Temporal variation of instantaneous secrecy rate RS,i (solid line) and the average
output voltage (dotted line) for the experimental data at 16:34:20 JST, just one minute after
the sunset time, on 17 November 2015. In each time slot, the measurement duration is 4
ms and 4× 104 bits are contained. For comparison, the ergodic secrecy rate RS,erg (chain
line) and the long span secrecy rate RS,T (dashed line) are also shown. Two upper left insets
are the histograms of the output voltage of the detectors for the best case (between 24 ms
and 28) and the worst case (between 144 ms and 148 ms). The upper rightmost inset is
the output voltage histogram for the whole period of the 200 ms transmission. Width of
histogram bins are 0.3 mV both for Bob’s and Eve’s data. In the histogram, we subtracted
the DC offset of the detector from the received signal.
JST, just one minute after the sunset time. Contrary to Fig. 4, the difference between the best
case (8.75 Mbps, from 24 ms to 28 ms) and the worst case (0 bps, from 144 ms to 148 ms) is
much more distinct. For the best case, the signal via the main channel is quite distinguishable
while that via the wiretapper channel is hardly distinguished as seen in the upper left inset. On
the other hand, around the time slot of the worst case, the instantaneous secrecy rate decreases
suddenly. This is because the wiretapper channel is error-free and hence Eve can establish a
reliable channel from Alice. It is estimated that the beam centroid should have suddenly been
gotten closer to Eve’s one. The output voltage histograms for the whole period of the 200 ms
transmission are shown in the upper-right inset of Fig. 5. Compared to the one in Fig. 4, their
shapes are much broader or heavy-tailed. This means that the atmospheric turbulences in this
time period are much more pronounced than that in the late evening time. Similar to Fig. 4, the
variations of Bob’s average output voltage (dotted line) seem not to have a direct correlation
with the instantaneous secrecy rate RS,i (solid line). Therefore, even in the present receiver con-
figuration, based on the Eve-near-Bob scenario in [12], the possible spatial correlation between
Eve’s and Bob’s channels does not show a significant impact on the secrecy rate.
Figures 4 and 5 indicate that Alice and Bob should find good atmospheric conditions so as
to avoid a sudden fatal information leakage. If there is a good correlation between Bob’s and
Eve’s observations on some straightforward measure, such as the average output voltages, then
Alice and Bob could roughly infer an attainable secrecy rate (or its lower bound) by looking
only at output voltage of Bob’s detector. Unfortunately, however, no good correlation between
the secrecy rate and Bob’s average output voltage was seen in Figs. 4 and 5. One way is to use
Bob’s output voltage histograms which are measured for a longer time (e.g., 200 ms like as in
Figs. 4 and 5) than a fading time scale as the partial CSI. If the histogram is broader, the secrecy
rate varies and the fatal information leakage would occur, implying that Alice and Bob should
avoid from such durations. Thus Alice and Bob can use appropriate pilot signals, compare the
histogram with accumulated data, and opportunistically choose good time durations like Fig. 4.
4.3. Code word over a longer time span
Even in the larger fading case like Fig. 5, if a fast feed-forward mechanism could be employed,
one might be able to use an appropriate wiretap channel code, adapting changes of the channel
states due to fading-induced scintillation. This is, however, technically challenging.
Another possibility is to find a good code appropriately designed for the observations over a
longer time span, just as shown in the upper rightmost inset in Fig. 5. To distinguish these long
span transition probabilities from instantaneous ones, we shall call the former the long span
transition probabilities, and denote them as E[PY |X ,HB ] and E[PZ|X ,HE ] for Bob’s and Eve’s chan-
nels, respectively. They are actually statistical mixtures of the instantaneous channel transition
probabilities of Eq. (6) and have much wider spread in distribution.
We can then calculate the secrecy rate for these long span transition probabilities as
RS,T ≡ I(PX ,E[PY |X ,HB ])− I(PX ,E[PZ|X ,HE ]), (8)
which we call the long span secrecy rate. The value of RS,T (3.71 Mbps) is shown as the dashed
line in Fig. 5. As seen, the long span secrecy rate RS,T itself remains reasonably high, even
though there appear fatal decreases of the instantaneous secrecy rates in the observed time
span. In such fatal regions, Eve’s channel remains error-free as shown in the upper middle
inset. The result of the long span secrecy rate implies that there exists a good code to deceive
Eve even in such a situation provided that the channel states remain as they are in Fig. 5 for an
even longer period such that the channel can be used many times with such a good code. For
example, one may spread a message onto a code word over the long spanned observation with
sufficient randomization, and attain the secrecy even under the fading like in Fig. 5.
Interestingly, under the assumption that both the input probability distribution PX and the
input power are fixed over the whole time period and the main channel is almost error-free, the
long span secrecy rate RS,T is slightly larger than the ergodic secrecy rate RS,erg (see Appendix
B) which is just defined as the average of the instantaneous secrecy rates
RS,erg ≡ E[RS,i(hB,hE)], (9)
and is often used to see an overall throughput in fading channels [34]. The value of RS,erg
(2.77 Mbps) is shown as the chain line in Fig. 5 and corroborates the above point. In order to
achieve the ergodic secrecy rate RS,erg, one should employ a fast feed-forward mechanism to
adapt changes in a fading channel, which is technically challenging, as stated above. Thus the
transmission of a code word over a longer time span would be more attractive as fading-resistant
techniques.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probability PS(RS,i < Rth) as a function of target rate Rth for 5
campaign periods on 17 November 2015. In each time period, 10 independent 200 ms FSO
transmissions (totally 20 Mbits), namely, 500 of 4 ms FSO transmission is contained.
Table 1. The mean values of the scintillation index σ2I and refractive-index structure
constant C2n for each campaign perioda.
Campaign period Mean σ2I Mean C2n [m−2/3]
14:43 - 14:46 0.076 2.17×10−16
15:57 - 16:00 0.408 1.16×10−15
16:33 - 16:36
(sunset time) 0.168 4.79×10
−16
17:37 - 17:40 0.034 9.69×10−17
18:10 - 18:13 0.044 1.26×10−16
aTo calculate σ2I and C2n in this table of each 200 ms transmission, we selected the event where the light source is on.
4.4. Secrecy outage probability
In the previous subsection, we observed that the received signal statistics of the long term
transmission serves as a partial CSI of the wiretap channel. Alice and Bob can utilize this to
determine whether they conduct secure message transmission or not. However, they may dare
to perform secure message transmission even with compromising the confidentiality. In such a
situation, a natural question arisen is then how is the trade-off relation between the throughput
and the risk of information leakage. In this case, the secrecy outage probability provides a
quantitative metric.
The secrecy outage probability PS(RS,i < Rth) is defined as the cumulative probability that
an instantaneous secrecy rate RS,i is smaller than a given target rate Rth. This outage prob-
ability quantifies how often fatal information leakage occurs when the wiretap channel code
is employed at constant rate Rth. Obviously, the secrecy outage probability is a monotone in-
crease function of target rate Rth, which indicates the trade-off relation between security and
throughput.
Figure 6 depicts the outage probability PS(RS,i < Rth) for 5 campaign periods. In each time
period, 10 independent 200 ms transmissions (totally 20 Mbits) are contained. The instanta-
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Fig. 7. (a) Code length dependence of leaked information measure δEn between 76 ms and
80 ms in Fig. 4. (b) Repetition rate dependence of leaked information measure δEn over the
whole observation time of 200 ms in Fig. 5.
neous rate RS,i is calculated in the duration of 4 ms. The time variations of the instantaneous
secrecy rate are illustrated in right panels for 14:43 - 14:46 JST and 17:37 - 17:40 JST.
The behavior of the outage probability shown in Fig. 6 is well reflected in the behaviors of
the scintillation index σ2I and the refractive-index structure constant C2n [33] shown in Table 1.
For example, before the sunset time, C2n indicates a larger value over 10
−16. On the other hand,
one hour after the sunset time (17:37 - 17:40), C2n becomes the smaller value below 10
−16,
and C2n turns to be a slightly larger value after further 30 minutes later (18:10 - 18:13). Such a
temporal suppression of fading-induced scintillation one hour after the sunset time has already
been observed in the past experiment held in NICT [35].
As shown in Fig. 6, the secrecy outage probability is almost negligible even when the target
rate is set to be more than 1 Mbps in the late evening time (17:37 - 17:40), meaning that
the perfect secure transmission at high throughput is possible. On the other hand, before the
sunset time (14:43 - 14:46), the outage probability still remains to be 0.01 even if the target
rate decreases to 10 kbps. Such kind of larger outage probability alerts that the perfect secrecy
cannot be guaranteed solely by the wiretap channel code with Rth = 10 kbps. It advices that
some backup encryption schemes in the upper layers should be activated to prepare for the
worst case scenario.
4.5. Finite length analysis
Although the secrecy rate is regarded as a reasonable benchmark of the system, it concerns only
the asymptotic limit at code length n→ ∞. Practically, in the bounded-code-length scenario,
the message rate RB cannot be arbitrarily close to the secrecy rate as well as the information
leakage cannot be completely diminished. Thus, in order to design a practical code with the
perfect secrecy, the message rate RB should be chosen much lower than the secrecy rate and
the necessary code length n for the required secrecy criteria should be known. This motivates
researchers [36–38] to introduce the secrecy exponent Hsec(RE) (see Appendix C), which is a
stronger characterization showing how fast the leaked information decreases. Actually, in [25],
through the upper bound on the leaked information measure δEn ≤ e−nHsec(RE ), where the leaked
information measure δEn is measured by a statistical distance between distributions [25, 36],
the code length dependence of δEn has been investigated in the idealistic fading free model,
or constant channel gain model. In what follows, we consider the application of Hsec(RE) on
atmospheric fading channels.
First, we consider the case with the weaker fading case, such as in Fig. 4. In this case, the
fluctuation of the instantaneous secrecy rate is also weak. We may select the worst time slot,
design a code for it, and apply it for the whole interval such as 200 ms in Fig. 4. Now, our
purpose is to investigate what code length is required in this time slot. In Fig. 7(a), we show the
code length dependence of the leaked information criteria δEn on the time slot of the worst case
(from 76 ms to 80 ms) in Fig. 4. Clearly, as RB decreases (or the randomness rate RE increases,
since we assume that sum of the rates RB +RE is fixed), δEn decreases faster, attaining a given
criterion δEn with a shorter code length. When Alice and Bob set RB to be 3 Mbps (the dotted
line in Fig. 7(a)), δEn < 10−20 can be obtained by a code with n = 103. Since this value serves
as the upper bound over the whole time period, Alice and Bob reasonably achieve the secure
message transmission with fixing the message rate RB = 3 Mbps and the code length n = 103.
For the curve of RB = 4 Mbps (dashed line), the required code length for δEn < 10−20 is n= 104
and still reasonable. On the other hand, as we raise the rate up to RB = 5 Mbps (solid line),
which is close to the instantaneous secrecy rate RS,i = 5.25 Mbps (see Fig. 4), n = 105 of code
word is required for δEn = 10−20. However, considering that the repetition rate is 10 MHz and
the time slot duration is 4 ms, this code length is out of a consistent design.
Next and finally, we discuss finite length analysis in the larger fading case like in Fig. 5. In
Subsection 4.3, we have already discussed a fading resistant technique based on a code word
over a longer time span, i.e., the whole observation time of 200 ms. The input repetition rate
was set as 10 MHz. This means that there are 2× 106 symbols in the whole span, and the
code length is also 2×106. This length is however, considerably long, and readily causes large
coding complexity. To reduce such complexity, one must set a lower repetition rate Rrep for a
fixed observation time TO, where the code length n is determined as n = RrepTO. Figure 7(b)
shows how fast the leaked information criteria δEn decreases as the repetition rate Rrep for a
given message rate RB = m/n. As easily imaged, if the larger message rate is required, the
repetition rate must be higher for attaining a given level of secrecy, and hence the code length
should also be longer according to n = RrepTO. Suppose that we set the secrecy criteria as
δEn < 10−20. Then for a message rate RB = 0.2 bits/letter, the repetition rate and the code length
must be set roughly as Rrep = 10 kHz and n = 2×103, respectively, which realizes the secure
message transmission at 2 kbps. For a higher message rate RB = 0.37 bits/letter, the repetition
rate and the code length should be Rrep = 13.8 MHz and n = 2.77×106, respectively, realizing
the 5.13 Mbps secure message transmission.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have discussed the feasibility of PHY security in real-field FSO links. Using
Tokyo FSO Testbed, we could gather the experimental data for various atmospheric conditions
which will meet satellite-to-ground laser communications. We exploited three information the-
oretical quantities as performance measures, the secrecy rates, the secrecy outage probability
and the expected code lengths for given secrecy criteria. We observed that the real conditions
influence the temporal variation of the instantaneous secrecy rate; the temporal variation is
stable in the late evening time, whereas it is much stronger before the sunset time. When the
variation of secrecy rate is stable, Alice and Bob can establish the secure message transmission
with reasonable code lengths. On the other hand, when the variation of secrecy rate is much
heavier, Alice and Bob can assess the possibility of secure message transmission using a good
and longer code designed based on the long span statistics of the channel. Quantitatively, they
can calculate the probability of the fatal information leakage via the secrecy outage probabil-
ity. Combining the PHY security with upper-layer cryptographic schemes, they may be able to
establish secure communication even in the heavy fading condition.
In this paper, we mainly focused on the secure message transmission via the wiretap channel.
As was stated, the opportunistic transmission may be impractical in the configuration of this
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Fig. 8. Bin width dependence of the mutual information I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) for the time slot
from 76 ms to 80 ms in Fig. 4.
paper since a fast adaptive optimization over input probability distribution, input power, and
message rate is required. However, in the delay tolerant communication such as secret key
agreement [18, 19] using public channels, this opportunistic approach will work effectively. In
secret key agreement, Alice and Bob can opportunistically select appropriate time slots after
sharing initial randomness, and apply information reconciliation and privacy amplification to
the data in these time slots. Moreover, the secrecy rate gives a lower bound for the achievable
secret key rate. The experimental result gathered via Tokyo FSO Testbed campaign tells us that
the implementation of secret key agreement scheme in this testbed is straightforward. Thus, the
feasibility study of this scheme in real field FSO communications will be a next target of this
campaign.
With a direct analysis, this study provides quantitative assessment of the key rate reduction
from the eavesdropper in real channel conditions. This is a strong support for the further study
of this effect with a mobile attack, as for instance in the case of Eve on a drone. Moreover,
although our results were obtained in horizontal terrestrial propagation, we believe that our
feasibility study is a first step towards a realization for large-scale deployment of PHY security
in FSO communication. PHY security in FSO communication will open a new paradigm for the
basis of high-capacity and high-altitude secure communications exploiting satellites, air planes
and drones.
Appendix A: Bin width ∆ for evaluating I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) with soft-decision decoding
In this appendix, we discuss the bin width ∆ for evaluating the mutual information
I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) based on soft-decision decoding. The bin width for Bob’s output voltage his-
togram (Figs. 4 and 5) was also determined by the same procedure.
Ideally, one should make the bin width ∆ as finely as possible. In practice, however, the
finite sample size of experimental data sets the lower bound on allowed values of ∆. To deter-
mine such a lower bound, we investigate the bin width dependence of the mutual information
I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) in Fig. 8. For large ∆, I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) stays at a constant value which corresponds
to the value for hard-decision decoding. On the other hand, as ∆ decreases, the curve starts
climbing steadily at 20 mV, and then reaches a plateau around at I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) = 0.475 bit per
letter, the value for soft-decision decoding. Note that the noise equivalent power (NEP) of Eve’s
APD, 12 mV, is located in the slope of this increase. As ∆ decreases further, I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) turns
to increase again at around 0.3 mV. This is due to the lack of sample size, namely, one can ar-
tificially construct non-overlap distributions for the input signals 0 and 1, which is of course a
fake. Hence, we adopt 0.3 mV as the bin width ∆which is neither too large not to underestimate
I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) nor too small to mitigate the effect of limited sample size.
Appendix B: Superiority of RS,T over RS,erg
In this appendix, we show that under the condition that both the input probability PX and input
power are fixed over all coherence interval, and the main channel is almost error free, the long
span secrecy rate RS,T outperforms the ergodic secrecy rate RS,erg.
As is well known [39], the mutual information I(P,W ) is a convex function of transition
probability W with the fixed input probability distribution P. Thus, the following inequality
holds from the Jensen’s inequality [39];
E[I(P,W )]≥ I(P,E[W ]). (10)
Using this inequality, we have
RS,erg = E[I(PX ,PY |X ,HB)− I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE )] (11)
≤ I(PX ,E[PY |X ,HB ])− I(PX ,E[PZ|X ,HE ]) (12)
= RS,T, (13)
where Eq. (12) follows from the assumption that Bob’s channel is almost error-free and apply-
ing Eq. (10) on I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ).
Appendix C: Definition of secrecy exponent
In this appendix, we give the definition of the secrecy exponent Hsec(RE). The secrecy exponent
Hsec(RE) is defined as
Hsec(RE)≡ max
0≤ρ<1
(
φ(−ρ|PZ|X ,HE ,PX )+ρRE ln2
)
, (14)
where
φ(−ρ|PZ|X ,HE ,PX )≡− ln
K
∑
i=1
(
∑
x={0,1}
PX (x)PZ|X ,HE (z
(i)|x,hE)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
, (15)
with 0≤ ρ < 1.
The secrecy exponent Hsec(RE) is monotone strictly positive increasing in RE >
I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ) and becomes 0 for RE ≤ I(PX ,PZ|X ,HE ). This is the manifestation of the tradeoff
relation between information rate and secrecy [36]: namely, for more secure communication,
one should increase RE for the price of sacrificing the information rate RB.
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